9A/ Birth Attestation = Initial Guardianship

Birth Attestation = Initial Guardianship

Wednesday 9A

Convener: iRespond / Ed Eykholt

Notes-taker(s): Neil Thomson

Discussion notes, key understandings, outstanding questions, observations, and, if appropriate to this discussion: action items, next steps:

This session is being recorded

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UNiD Node

Uses (eye) iris camera

Returns a UNiD (Unique Numeric Identifier)

iRespond has a project which is using iris camera to better identify migrant and citizen children born in Thailand (Yay Nam Tao Clinic! / Mae Tao Clinic)

1600 babies born per year in this clinic.

Currently produces a hand-written birth record.

Digital paper (security paper) – as ‘minimal device’ – essentially bank note paper

The two QR codes, etc. in bottom right are unique per piece of paper, the rest is generated for each birth

Not a live project yet – this birth attestation has not been rolled out. This is in process (software in development)

Has a lot of interest for use of this technique for other identity circumstances.

It is not known if the Government(s) and officials (e.g. schools) will accept these IDs/documents.

Will have to be proactive in working with the governments.

The scope of this pilot was to produce digital and non-digital (linked) identity.

The problem in Thailand is the porous border with Myanmar

The digital document (with minimal data) can also be printed on paper.

Carrying the OVD paper is a digital id.

This is initially just for Birth Attestation to get a Birth Certificate, which is the currently recognized document in both Thailand and Myanmar.

Can we bring them a process and tool

Peter Simpson.

An issue is also document recovery – in case the issued digital paper is lost. Much cheaper if stored digitally to reproduce.

Also an attempt to provide a document recognized by both documents.

Ed Eykholt

Also looking at other Biometric capture tools – iris cameras can be problematic for infants (distance between eyes relative to head.

Need an infant iris camera, but looking at other biometrics tools as well.

Will be different in each region based on the legal systems and government identity systems in each region.

Looking to work with other locations – refugee camps and hospitals

This approach only makes sense if it will be acceptable for life - a long term DID mechanism.

“Proof of existence” a very important. Access to school, immunization, etc. The security of the document is key. They are like passports in the level of sophistication.

Running paper (physical) and fully digital in parallel

Have deployed wallets on a lot of android phones and a lot are not compatible

Why chose iris scan vs,. finger prints

Non-touch is important

Iris are very unique

Finger prints not recorded for 20% of the population in many regions

Chris Raczkowski - Sovrin certainly (Sovrin) interested in fully supporting the project as are many others

Eric Welton - in effectively in a disputed non-state area in Thailand/Myanmar border. The health system is porous on who is who and undocumented is a reality for many people. There is a high resistance to a new process, so the goal is to run in parallel

Comment: Many phones (e.g. android) non-compatible - particularly at the low cost end - with wallets or any applications. This approach avoids that problem and provides a usable lowest common and secure mechanism (paper) in parallel with digital. Sounds like the immediate future. There is a lot to learn from this to apply everywhere (including COVID-19)

Comment: This parallel approach gives a solution that would be pragmatic for many seniors (40% in Canada over 75)) who are not tech-savvy

COVID-19 has slowed things down. Producing a simple physical key with only a focused purpose that can be carried by the person is meeting higher acceptance than a pure digital solution.

Data has value when it flows,

A church in Hollywood has issues with a large homeless population. Issues with a person in late 70’s without any ID (no social security number). Took years without attestation to secure a new SSN. Is a huge problem everywhere.

Refugees and homeless are very suspicious of registries for them - as bad things have happened in the past. This is why minimal information is collected (minimal personal disclosure) to establish identity (e.g. metrics such as iris image).

Goal - create a non-reputable proof of existence - which is acceptable anywhere. Get into the official, local systems (exchange birth attestation for birth certificate/social security card) using a common agreed “root”.

With COVID-19 is more important to have everyone tested and have a traceable record tied to an Identity than to have only those who are officially registered (e.g. has a birth certificate).

This situation illustrates the need for an identity that is independent across borders and technologies and that having a complimentary (non-competing) DID

Question - A barrier can be local administration. What about identifying (and “certifying”) and delegating exactly who can generate the birth attestation? This can be important to local authorities.

Sounds like an opportunity to share experiences (e.g. Kiva w iRespond UNiD)

Guardianship - of the Identity vs. supporting the actual guardian (mother -> child) . Who is the ultimate guardian of the (digital) data.

How would the child (as they grow up) use the birth attestation ID, what happens once the QR code is scanned?

The DID of the issuer will aid in the proof of existence - assuming the personal DID and issuer did are on a ledger. If a revocation is needed, the ledger record will also assist.

How does the QR code lead to other information?

How does the iris scan/camera work - it generates a biometric template, which is sent to repository service in the cloud. If the template matches - that is returned, otherwise it generates a new id and returns that.

Have not worked out the “Guardianship” lifecycle (as shown above).

There will be many types of credentials (or identities) including revocations - and where is that recorded (sounds like a personal identity vault).

After birth, immunization records are key to health (second DID contact point).

How to generate QR code to be universally accepted - is CBOR-LD the right way to go?

Concerns with putting a large amount of data into a QR code - which may be difficult to scan - QR codes only as an “introduction” (or a pointer/Digital Link) to other sources of information.

Where is the project going:

KISS - keep the information essential, but minimal

Work in progress - learning lots of lessons

Don’t want biometric data flying all over the place.

How to make this a “bearer token” that people can use. Might not be a problem at a hospital. But is this something (like the QR code) that is simple enough to be forged?

There are biometrics readers that are good for verification, but forgery is a known and existing issue.

Education on exactly what this “ID” is intended for and where is it intended to be actually used.

So is the main purpose that this birth attestation is intended to go to an authority that will use it to produce a more “forgery robust” ID (e.g. the paper document is only used for verification into the “official” ID