How can trusted identities be accepted by governments and industries?

How Can Trusted Identities Be Accepted By Governments and Industries?

Tuesday 4D

Convener: Scott Perry

Notes-taker(s): Thomas Berry

Tags for the session - technology discussed/ideas considered:

Discussion notes, key understandings, outstanding questions, observations, and, if appropriate to this discussion: action items, next steps:

• Collecting identities to add trust is too much work
• Australia: trusted digital identity framework (everything must be registered/imported)
• What would it take for a country to accept fingerprints obtained from another (identity proofing)
• Credential is issued for a service and used for someone nefarious; who is liable?
• Credit unions are getting exciting self-sovereign credentials to its customers; works within a single credit union (issuer and relying party); uses credential with another institution (bank) what is going to happen?
• The issuer can’t be responsible for how the extended identity has been used.
• The elements of consent has to be trusted (i.e., donor label on driver’s license)
• What is needed to trust the identification
  • Issuer of identity
  • Who is the auditor of the issuer
• what does the relying party have to care about the issuer
  • The relying party only cares about making money; more money, more risk (accepted)
• User experience is the biggest driver; more cases of use is a driver for acceptance
• Business: identity proofing shop, issue digital credential that proves identification
  • Issue: acceptance (government, medical, etc.)
  • Australia: MyGov and Medical; not interchangeable